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Tfhis "L,egal Solutions in Health Reform" paper iden-
tifies and analyzes the legal issues raised by health
insurance exchanges. Like all Legal Solutions papers,
it does not purport to provide a concrete proposal as to
how health insurance exchanges should be organized
or even whether they should play a role in health care
reform. Rather, it attempts simply to describe the legal
issues that health insurance exchanges raise, and to
propose alternative solutions to legal problems where
useful. More specifically, it analyzes and offers alterna-
tive solutions to the legal problems raised by proposals
to establish insurance exchanges by the federal gov-
ernment, by state governments, and by private enti-
ties or associations. Because the focus of this project
and paper is on legal issues, discussion of policy and
design issues is attenuated. Nevertheless, some atten-
tion to policy issues is unavoidable because law is the
realization of policy.
liealth insurance exchanges are entities that orga-
nize the market for health insurance, much like stock
exchanges do for securities or farmers' markets for
produce. They are intended to facilitate the avail-
ability, choice, and purchase of private health insur-
ance plans for individuals and the employees of small
groups. They are usually government or non-profit
institutions, but can be operated by the state or fed-
eral government or by private business associations or
even by businesses.'
I lealth insurance exchanges have been widely dis-
cussed as a solution to problems in the market for pri-
vate health insurance. They figure prominently in the
reform campaign plan proposed by President Obama,
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while a health insurance exchange, the "Connector,"
is at the heart of the much-discussed Massachusetts
health reform program. 2 The bipartisan Wyden-
Bennett health insurance plan also relies on health
insurance exchanges to organize the health insurance
market. Another bipartisan bill, the Small Business
Health Options Program Act of 2008 (S. 2795), has
been introduced specifically to "establish a nationwide
health insurance purchasing pool..":
At a minimum, exchanges centralize individual
health plan enrollment and premium payments. They
also provide information about insurance plans to
those who purchase insurance through them, thus
permitting individuals to compare the products of a
number of insurers and to choose the best product
for their needs. Exchanges can be used to facilitate
employer payment for insurance premiums, includ-
ing direct payments by individuals and payments
collected by employers from employees through tax-
advantaged Section 125 cafeteria arrangements or
non- tax-advantaged payroll deductions.4 They could
also be used to facilitate the use of tax credits to pur-
chase insurance. Some authors would limit exchanges
to these functions, and indeed define exchanges in
these terms.5
Other advocates would, however, give exchanges
additional, more regulatory, responsibilities. Exchanges
can, for example, define the benefits that participat-
ing plans must cover or specify the rating practices
that they must follow with respect to exchange pur-
chasers. The Obama campaign health plan would,
for example, establish a national exchange to, "act as
a watchdog group and help reform the private insur-
ance market by creating rules and standards for par-
ticipating insurance plans to ensure fairness and to
make individual coverage more affordable and acces-
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sible."6 The Obama exchange proposal would "require
that all the plans offered are at least as generous as
the new public plan and have the same standards for
quality and efficiency."7 It would also "evaluate plans
and make the differences among the plans, including
cost of services, transparent."8 The State Health Help
Agencies included in the proposed Wyden-Bennett
Healthy Americans Act would be required to "develop
standardized language for HAPI [Healthy American
Private Insurance] plan terms and conditions and
require participating health insurance issuers to use
such language in plan information documents," as well
as to ensure that plans follow the rating rules provided
by the ActY The Massachusetts Connector, the most
prominent currently existing example of an insurance
exchange, also has extensive regulatory responsibili-
ties, as described below. An exchange 'With regulatory
responsibilities would look very much like the health
alliances proposed by the Clinton Health Security Act
or like various proposed purchasing cooperatives or
like those created by the states during the 1990s.
In this paper, I will use the term "exchange" broadly
to cover a range of entities, public and private, that (1)
facilitate the purchase of private insurance plans by
individuals and employees, and (2) make available to
these individuals and employees a choice of a range
of insurance plans. I include exchanges that perform
additional regulatory functions."',
The best known contemporary model of a health
insurance exchange is the Massachusetts Connector,
a model that is being considered by a number of other
states." The Massachusetts Connector is a quasi-public
authority governed by a ten-member board, with three
members appointed by the governor, three members
appointed by the attorney general, and four members
who serve by virtue of their government positions.'1
The Connector's responsibilities include the follow-
ing: (1) facilitating the purchase of insurance by indi-
viduals and small groups (of 50 or fewer members) by
providing a centralized exchange for the purchase of
approved health insurance products and by collecting
premium payments from individuals and employers
and remitting these to insurers; (2) defining the crite-
ria that insurance products must meet to offer mini-
mum creditable coverage for purposes of the state's
legal mandate that individuals purchase such cover-
age; (3) administering the new Commonwealth Care
Health Insurance Program for lower-income Mas-
sachusetts residents; (4) certifying if uninsured resi-
dents are unable to find insurance they can afford for
purposes of being excused from the individual man-
date; (5) establishing regulations for the § 125 cafete-
ria arrangements that employers must establish under
the Massachusetts reform; and (6) offering insurance
at reduced rates for uninsured young adults between
the ages of 18 and 26.'a
Although some market advocates have hailed insur-
ance exchanges (including the Connector) as a private
market solution to the problems of health care cost,
access, and quality, the Connector is in fact a quasi-
government agency and many of its functions are
regulatory. Moreover, the Connector has fewer regula-
tory responsibilities than might have been necessary
to ensure a functioning insurance exchange in other
states because the health insurance market in Mas-
sachusetts was already heavily regulated before the
Connector was established. Even before the recent
reforms, the insurance market in Massachusetts was
subject to guaranteed issue requirements, modified
community rating with no medical underwriting, a
lengthy list of mandates, and a history of regulators
refusing to approve high cost-sharing, low-benefit
products (for which, in any event, there seemed to be
little consumer demand).'"
The Massachusetts Division of Insurance, rather
than the Connector, continues to enforce these require-
ments. The Massachusetts reform also instituted an
individual mandate, which plays a key role in control-
ling adverse selection against the Connector.
The extent to which exchanges act as regulators
is only one of the ways in which exchanges can vary
Another very important variable is whether they are
established at the federal, state, or local level. The
Obama campaign proposal contemplates a national
exchange as does the Small Business Health Options
Program Act of 2008 (S. 2795), while the Wyden-
Bennett proposal and state initiatives like the Massa-
chusetts Connector locate exchanges at the state level.
Additionally, private exchanges have been established
by employers or by business coalitions.15 Although
private exchanges lack regulatory authority, they have
their own purported advantages - more flexibility in
hiring and firing and the capacity to react more rap-
idly to changing conditions, for example.
With the election of President Obama, who cam-
paigned on a platform of health reform, and strong
Democratic majorities in both the House and Sen-
ate with leaders committed to health care financing
reform, there is the real possibility of health reform
legislation at the federal level. If we were assured that
Congress would adopt legislation creating a national
insurance exchange, this paper could be very short.
The only legal limit on the ability of Congress to adopt
legislation is the Constitution, and as will be discussed
shortly, the Constitution imposes minimal constraints
on the ability of Congress to act in this area. Congress
would face serious policy and design problems in cre-
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ating a national insurance exchange program, but
those issues are not the focus of this paper.
It is important to remember, however, that we have
been to the precipice of health insurance reform before,
and Congress has not jumped.16 It is possible that the
current economic crisis or other pressing policy pri-
orities will delay or even derail health care financing
reform. Were that to happen, the states would have to
take the initiative, as some of them are doing now. Con-
gress could remove some of the legal impediments that
now limit state reforms. Steps it could take to facilitate
the creation of insurance exchanges by the states are
described below. But Congress might not even do that,
leaving the states to navigate around existing law. The
states, moreover, are facing their own fiscal crises, and
many may take no action on their own if Congress fails
to act. This could leave the private sector to take the
initiative, and to find its way through the constraints
of both federal and state law.
This paper will proceed to explore the legal issues
presented by the range of possible futures of health
care financing reform. It will first explore the limits
that the law (primarily the Constitution) imposes on
federal attempts to establish purchasing exchanges.
Second, it will examine the constraints that federal law
imposes on states that choose to establish insurance
exchanges, considering both what Congress could do
to remove these impediments and how the states can
deal with them if Congress fails to act. Third, it dis-
cusses the legal constraints that the law imposes on pri-
vate insurance exchanges. Although these constraints
are imposed both by federal and state law, this paper
will fbcus on the issues raised by federal law, noting
that state law is varied and any concrete proposal for a
private exchange would need to be analyzed in detail
under the laws of the particular state in which it was
to be operated. Finally, the paper will summarize the
solutions it has suggested to the legal problems that it
has identified.
I. Federal Insurance Exchanges
One possible approach, found in the Obama campaign
plan, would be to establish a purchasing exchange at
the federal level. Ensuring that health insurance is
uniformly available across the country would be valu-
able in itself, and a national exchange could effectively
address the problems of adverse and favorable selec-
tion issues that are the central conundrums of health
insurance reform by creating massive risk pools. But
a single national exchange could also pose serious
administrative problems, particularly since there is
little expertise in regulating insurance at the national
level. It is quite possible, therefore, there would not
be one central exchange under a national reform pro-
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gram, but rather numerous exchanges established at
the state or regional level. This is the solution that has
been reached in regionalizing other federal programs.
Examples of regional entities that have adminis-
tered federal programs include Medicare contractors,
Medicare Peer Review Organizations, and the Health
Systems Agencies that were established under the
National Health Resources and Development Act in
the 1970s. Congress might even attempt to require the
states themselves to establish purchasing exchanges.
Of course, a single national exchange is not an impos-
sibility. The Federal Employees Health Benefits pro-
gram and the Medicare Advantage program are both
administered at the national level.
Were a national plan to be established, it would
face difficult design issues. Such issues would include
the following: (1) determining the regions exchanges
would cover, specifically whether they would be
restricted by state lines or cover regions or multi-
state metropolitan areas functioning like a single
market; (2) the administrative relationship between
exchanges and the central government, and whether
the exchanges would be administered by private con-
tractors (as in Medicare) or federal/state entities; and
(3) the level of uniformity that would be required in
the system, specifically whether premiums, coverage,
and eligibility requirements would be the same across
the country.'7 I focus here, however, on legal rather
than design problems.
A. Federalism Issues
First, implementation of a federal insurance exchange
would require resolution of federalism issues. The first
of these is the question of whether the federal gov-
ernment has the constitutional authority to regulate
health insurance contracts, i.e., whether the sale of
insurance contracts constitutes interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court decided in 1944 that the federal
government may constitutionally regulate insurance,"'
and although there have been intervening decisions
indicating that the federal government's interstate
commerce authority is not unbounded, that power
certainly extends to insurance regulation.
Congress would also need to consider the McCa-
rran-Ferguson Act. In response to the Court's rec-
ognition in the 1940s that Congress had the power
to regulate insurance contracts, Congress adopted a
statute providing that "regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier
to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.''"9 This means that Congress should not
be considered to have preempted or superseded state
55
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law in the area of health insurance unless it does so
expressly. This does not limit the power of Congress to
create federal insurance exchanges; it merely means
that Congress would have to do so explicitly.
Congress might attempt to implement a federal
exchange program through the states, thus taking
advantage of the insurance regulation institutions and
experience of the states. In doing so, it would need to
be mindful of the limitations the Constitution places
on the power of the federal government to control the
states. The Constitution has been interpreted to pre-
clude Congress from passing laws that "commandeer"
the authority of the states for federal regulatory pur-
poses.2') That is, Congress cannot require the states to
participate in a federal insurance exchange program
by simple fiat. This limitation, however, would not
necessarily block Congress from establishing insur-
ance exchanges. Congress could invite state participa-
tion in a federal program, and provide a federal fall-
back program to administer exchanges in states that
refused to establish complying exchanges.2' Alterna-
tively it could exercise its constitutional authority to
spend money for the public welfare (the "spending
power"), either by offering tax subsidies for insurance
only in states that complied with federal requirements
(as it has done with respect to tax subsidies for health
savings accounts) or by offering explicit payments to
states that establish exchanges conforming to federal
requirements. 22
B. General Cons•titUtional Constraintts
(Which App.• Also to State Insuurance Exchanges)
In addition to federalism issues, there are a variety of
general constitutional issues that would affect gov-
ernment exchanges. These issues would also apply
to state and federally established exchanges, but are
discussed only in this section to avoid duplication.
One of the fmnctions that an insurance exchange must
fulfill is deciding which insurers can sell their prod-
ucts through the exchange. Five possibilities here are
readily apparent. First, an exchange could allow any
insurer to sell its products through the exchange that
wanted to do so. Second, the exchange could permit
all insurers to participate that agreed to comply with
certain standards to sell their products, effectively an
"any willing provider" approach. Third, the exchange
could negotiate with insurers and only allow those to
participate that concluded satisfactory negotiations to
offer their products through the exchange. Fourth, the
exchange could decide to limit the number of insurers
allowed to offer their products through the exchange,
and then devise a process for deciding which insurers
would make the cut-off, and which would not. Finally,
the state could not only bar some insurers from the
exchange, but limit all insurance purchases (perhaps
in the individual and small group market) to insurers
participating in the exchange, effectively prohibiting
any residents of the state from purchasing insurance
from non-participating insurers.
One of the primary advantages of an exchange is that
it permits choice of insurers, particularly for employ-
ees of small businesses. Allowing broad participation
of insurers, therefore, would seem desirable. On the
other hand, another ideal that grounds health insur-
ance exchanges is that of organizing or structuring
competition among insurers. Indeed, there is some
evidence that too many choices can be confusing to
consumers..2 :' Thus, it might make sense for exchanges
to limit the number of insurers and participating plans
and to structure competition among those insurers.
Indeed, insurers might be prohibited from selling pol-
icies to individuals or small groups except through the
exchange. Insurance exchanges might also be required
to regulate the rating practices or benefit packages of
insurers who sell policies through them, thus limiting
participating insurers to those that accept limitations
on these practices.
If insurance exchanges are government-run or spon-
sored, their exclusionary or regulatory interventions
may raise constitutional issues.'24 The Due Process
Clause of the Constitution requires the government
to act rationally when it engages in social and eco-
nomic regulation, while the Equal Protection Clause
requires the government to make rational legislative
classifications and distinctions. The U.S. Constitution
and most states' constitutions prohibit the taking of
private property for public use without just compen-
sation. Finally, state governments are under an addi-
tional constraint of the Contracts Clause of the U.S.
Constitution prohibiting states from adopting laws
that impair "the obligation of contracts.'"25
Government regulation of economic conduct is
acceptable under the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion clauses as long as it bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest.26 Similarly, the
Contracts Clause challenges will not succeed unless
a challenged regulation "substantially impairs a con-
tractual relationship," does not promote a significant
and legitimate public interest, and is based on unrea-
sonable conditions unrelated to the public purpose. 27
Finally, a regulatory law can be challenged under the
takings clause, which bars the government from tak-
ing private property for public use without just com-
pensation, if the law goes "too far" in the severity of its
impact and in frustrating distinct "investment-backed
expectations."28
Insurance has long been a heavily regulated indus-
try, and constitutional challenges to requirements
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS56
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
imposed by an exchange through regulation or nego-
tiation arc unlikely to succeed unless the requirements
are wholly irrationalP.• Courts have repeatedly rejected
constitutional challenges to state insurance mandates,
including statutes requiring insurers to provide mater-
nity coverage:"' and coverage for mental disorders.31 In
the one reported constitutional case actually involving
an insurance purchasing exchange, a federal court in
Ken tuckv rejected Due Process and Commerce Clause
challenges brought by an insurer against a statutory
rei(uirement that insurers offer only standard plansapproved by a health policy board,'2 State statutes that
specifically restrict participation in markets by insur-
ers have also been upheld .3a In analogous areas, courts
have upheld the constitutionality of certificate of need
programs, which prohibit private health care provid-
ers from entering markets or expanding their market
participation without permission from the state,34 as
well as federal Medicare amendments that prohibit
physicians from selling their services to Medicare ben-
eliciaries outside of the Medicare program unless the
physician left the Medicare program for two years.3 5
Probably the category of constitutional challenges
most likely to succeed against reform laws establishing
exchanges are those brought under the Takings Clause.
To this point, all such challenges have been brought
against state rather than federal insurance regulation,
although the Takings Clause applies equally to both
federal and state governments. In a number of cases in
recent years particularly, severe state laws regulating
insurance have been successfully challenged under the
TAkings Clauses of the U.S. or of state constitutions,
prominently among them laws rolling back or freez-
ing rates, requiring insurers to fund residual markets
using profits from other states or lines of business, or
restricting insurers from exiting markets.,"3
The success of these challenges, however, seems
to be specific to particular jurisdictions. For each
instance in which a challenge has succeeded against
a paiirticular kind of law, similar laws in other jurisdic-
tions have survived similar constitutional challenges.
For example, in a case involving New York's attempt to
create a risk pooling mechanism, a court observed that
an insurer has no "constitutionally protected interest
in maintaining a healthier than average risk pool."''7
As insuirers face increasingly comprehensive regula-
tion analogous to that traditionally faced by public
utilities, a body of federal or state constitutional law
inay evolve providing insurers the right to make ajust
and reasonable return on their investment like that
currently claimed by public utilities.38 It remains true,
however, that government retains considerable discre-
tion in regulating a wide range of insurer behavior.
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Congress must take care that any insurance exchange
program it initiates and operates is non-discrimina-
tory and does not engage in confiscatory regulation. It
is unlikely that the Constitution will, however, prove
a significant barrier to the development of reasonable
insurance exchanges.
C. Other Legal Issues Raised by Federal Insurance
Exchanges
An insurance exchange established by federal law will
presumably be an agency subject to the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, including provisions relating to
the freedom of information, records privacy, open
meetings, rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial
review.3 9 Certain aspects of the program might also be
subject to the Federal Acquisitions Regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 405, which govern
federal purchases of products and services. These pro-
visions would need to be considered in designing the
exchange.
If Congress were to create federal purchasing
exchanges, then it would also need to amend a num-
ber of federal laws to clarify the relationship between
federal and state regulatory power. The most obvi-
ous of these would be the Employee Income Retire-
ment Security Act of 1974, which is discussed below.
Once the design of a federal insurance exchange
became clear, a comprehensive review of the federal
tax, employee benefit, and public health laws would
be necessary to ensure that they properly reflected the
balance of federal and state regulatory power contem-
plated by the purchasing exchange program.
II. State Insurance Exchanges
A. Constitutional Law
The constitutional law issues that affect state insur-
ance exchanges were discussed in the previous section
and will not be repeated here.
B. Governance Issues
If an exchange is established as a state agency, it will
be subject to state administrative law. About two-
thirds of the states have adopted some version of the
Model State Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
The Model State APA prescribes procedures for rule
making, adjudication, and judicial review. Each state
also has an open meetings and freedom of information
statute.40 State-run insurance exchanges will presum-
ably be subject to these laws unless they are specifi-
cally exempted by statute. 41 They will also presum-
ably be subject, like other state agencies, to state laws
addressing civil service, government contracting, and
government tort claims. These laws vary from state to
state, and cannot be discussed in detail here.
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Another issue that will have to be addressed is how
a state insurance exchange interfaces with other state
agencies. This is primarily a design issue, but will
require the drafting of new laws or the amendment of
existing laws for implementation. The Massachusetts
Connector was established as an independent author-
ity, but the Massachusetts Division of Insurance con-
tinues to regulate health insurance plans generally,
while the Department of Finance is responsible for
enforcement of the individual mandate. The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has
adopted both a "Single Health Care Voluntary Purchas-
ing Alliance Model Act" (78-1) and a "Regional Health
Care Voluntary Purchasing Alliance Model Act" (80-
1), which presents the states with different options for
creating exchanges at the state or regional level. These
statutes would place regional alliances under the state
commissioner of insurance, but establish a separate
state agency for the single state exchange authority.
The Single State Exchange Model Act states in a draft-
ing note,
This Act establishes the purchasing alliance as a
state agency. However, states may wish to establish
the purchasing alliance as a state-chartered non-
profit organization. States may also consider estab-
lishment under an existing state agency such as the
office of commissioner.42
States will also have to coordinate between the pur-
chasing alliance and other state agencies, including:
(1) the agency responsible for the Medicaid and State
Children's Health Insurance Program, if Medicaid or
SCHIP recipients are covered through the purchas-
ing pool; (2) the entity that purchases care for state
employees or retirees, if state employees or retirees
are covered through the purchasing pool; (3) the
state health insurance assistance program; and (4)
any separate agency that regulates managed care, if
applicable.
C. Issues Raised by Federal Law
If health insurance reform proceeds primarily at the
state rather than the federal level, the states will need
to come to terms with federal laws that limit their
options. To date, as noted above, insurance regulation
has primarily been the responsibility of the states. Con-
gress has, however, adopted a number of laws partially
preempting state authority over health insurance, par-
ticularly in the area of employee benefits. If the federal
government assumes responsibility for health care
financing or its regulation, these laws will presumably
be repealed or comprehensively amended to transfer
the responsibility of insurance regulation from the
states to the federal government. If Congress decides
rather to leave health reform to the states, Congress
could repeal or amend these laws to afford the states
the freedom to enact their own reform programs. If
Congress does nothing, the states will have to adapt to
these laws as they exist. This section explores the latter
two possibilities.
1. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974 PREEMPTION
In general, preemption is a legal principle that bars
state regulation of a subject if federal law expressly
precludes state regulation, if the state regulation
would conflict with federal law, or if the federal gov-
ernment comprehensively regulates an area of activ-
ity, thus excluding state regulation. For example, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
regulates the administration of employer-sponsored
benefit plans including health benefits. One of the
issues that state-established exchanges face is the pos-
sibility of ERISA preemption - that is that the federal
ERISA statute will bar states from establishing and
operating insurance exchanges in the manner they
would prefer. The general law of ERISA preemption is
fully addressed in another "Legal Solutions in Health
Reform" paper authored by Peter Jacobson. The
importance of ERISA, however, justifies some consid-
eration here. ERISA is also discussed further in the
next section with respect to the question of whether
its multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWA)
provisions affect private plans.
Section .514 of ERISA explicitly preempts any state
law that "relates to" an employee benefits plan.43 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean
that any state law is preempted that has "a connection
with or reference to" a benefits plan.44 Although ERISA
also provides that state laws that regulate insurance
are saved from preemption, it further stipulates that
states may not regulate self-insured insurance plans.
Finally, section 502 of ERISA has been construed by
the Supreme Court to preclude any state judicial rem-
edies against ERISA plans.45
In the insurance exchange context, ERISA preemp-
tion is likely to be an issue only with respect to state
laws that seek some way to compel an employer to
establish an employee benefit plan or to compel an
employee benefit plan to participate in an exchange. It
should not affect state insurance exchanges in which
participation is strictly voluntary and which do not
require action to be taken by either an employer or an
employee benefits plan. ERISA would also not affect
private exchanges that do not have legal authority to
require employers or benefit plans to participate.41
ERISA explicitly saves from preemption state laws
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regulating insurance, 47 and thus ERISA would not
limit a state's ability to require insurers to sell their
products through an insurance exchange or to regu-
late the products insurers sell through exchanges. This
is consistent with the long-standing policy of Con-
gress, articulated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, to
leave the regulation of insurance to the states. ERISA
should also not preclude a state from requiring indi-
viduals to purchase insurance through an insurance
exchange."
ERISA, however, does impose significant limitations
on the states. ERISA almost certainly prohibits states
fromn requiring any employer offering health benefits
to provide those benefits through an exchange. Such
a law would be seen as a law "relating to" an ERISA
benefits plan, preempted by federal law.4- ERISA
might also preclude states from imposing a require-
ment directly on employers who do not currently
provide health insurance benefits to begin providing
health insurance through an exchange or to pay an
assessment to the state. Federal courts are now split
on the question of preemption of state "pay or play"
laws and the enforceability of such laws may turn on
their precise provisions?° Finally, it would be unwise
for a state insurance exchange statute to explicitly
mention ERISA plans lest it fall afoul of the "reference
to" prohibition. In one case, for example, the Supreme
Court held that a state law prohibiting garnishment
of ERISA benefits to be preempted because of the
explicit reference to ERISA plans in the law.51
One unsettled issue is whether ERISA would pro-
hibit states that establish insurance exchanges from
requiring employers who do not otherwise offer health
insurance to forward payments, taken out of their
employees' wages on a payroll deduction basis, to the
exchanges, through a section 125 Cafeteria arrange-
ment.,2 A section 125 Cafeteria arrangement allows
an employer to withhold a sum of money specified by
the employee on a pre-tax basis from an employee's
wages, and allows the employee to use that money to
purchase certain specific benefits.53 States considering
health insurance reform in general and health insur-
ance exchanges in particular have found the section
125 option of particular interest. Specifically, the see-
tion 125 option allows employees to obtain federal
tax subsidies for their own expenditures so that they
can purchase insurance through an exchange, assum-
ing that ERISA does not allow the states to require
employers to offer their employees health insurance
purchased through an exchange. The Massachusetts
law, as noted above, requires employers with more
than 11 workers (under the threat of a penalty if other
conditions are met) to establish section 125 arrange-
ments for their employees, through which funds may
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be channeled to the Connector to purchase health
insurance.
As discussed below, it is arguable that a section
125 arrangement is a "group health plan" under the
Internal Revenue Code. It could be argued by exten-
sion that it is also an ERISA plan, and thus that
ERISA prohibits states from requiring employers to
establish section 125 Cafeteria arrangements through
which employee contributions can be channeled to
insurance exchanges. There are, however, convinc-
ing arguments that section 125 arrangements are not
ERISA plans. First, ERISA defines an employee ben-
efits plan as a plan "established or maintained" by an
employer.54 In several instances, courts have found
that an ERISA plan did not exist when employers
simply assisted employees in paying individual health
or disability insurance premiums from the employee's
own funds without further involvement in the insur-
ance relationship.55
Second, the Labor Department regulations estab-
lish a safe harbor that excludes from the ERISA plan
definition "group or group-type" insurance arrange-
ments if five conditions are met: (1) the employer does
not contribute its own funds; (2) employee participa-
tion is voluntary; (3) the employer does not "endorse"
the arrangement; (4) the employer does nothing more
than to allow an insurer to publicize the arrangement
to employees and to collect premiums through payroll
deductions; and (5) the employer receives no consid-
eration beyond reasonable compensation for adminis-
trative services.-6
There are dozens of cases litigating the application
of this safe harbor to particular arrangements, usually
in the context of an insurer seeking the protection of
ERISA preemption against a state law claim brought
by an aggrieved member. This litigation generally
focuses on the third safe-harbor criterion - the prohi-
bition against endorsement by an employer. The cases
tend to hold that if an objectively reasonable employee
would conclude that an employer has not simply made
a plan available, but has also exercised control over
the plan or made it appear to be part of the employer's
own benefit package, the arrangement will be consid-
ered an ERISA plan. If an employer becomes actively
involved in the promotion or administration of a plan
funded through a section 125 arrangement, courts are
likely to find the plan to be an ERISA plan on employer
endorsement grounds.57
If, on the other hand, an employer simply col-
lects premiums from employees on a payroll deduc-
tion basis and forwards them to insurers, then courts
should find that no ERISA plan exists.Y If a section 125
Cafeteria arrangement exists solely by operation of a
state law requirement, and the employer has taken no
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action to endorse the purchase of insurance through
the arrangement other than to comply with state law,
it is difficult to see why the arrangement would not
fit within the ERISA safe harbor.5'! The argument that
an employer has not endorsed a plan would be par-
ticularly strong if a state directed employee funds col-
lected under a section 125 arrangement to a purchas-
ing exchange rather than to a particular insurance
plan, as the employee and not the employer would be
choosing the employee's insurance plan through the
exchange."1
Third and finally, the only Department of Labor
advisory opinion examining the question of ERISA
and section 125 arrangements concluded that a sec-
tion 125 arrangement was not "the equivalent of the
provision of a benefit enumerated under" the ERISA
definition of an ERISA plan.'• Thus, a state require-
ment that employers allow their employees to pay for
health benefits through a state insurance purchasing
exchange by way of a section 125 arrangement would
not seem to be preempted by ERISA.
Congress could, of course, amend section 125 of
the Tax Code and ERISA to clarify that the states can
require employers to establish section 125 arrange-
ments to allow employees to purchase individual
health insurance policies, including policies purchased
through a state-sponsored health insurance exchange.
The Department of Labor could probably accomplish
the same end through an administrative regulation or
ruling, given the uncertainty in this area. Alternatively,
Congress could simply extend the tax subsidies cur-
rently offered in employment-related health insurance
to individual insurance, which would obviate the need
for section 125 arrangements. In the absence of any
amendments in the federal law, however, it appears
that the states are permitted to require employers to
establish section 125 plans for the purchase of insur-
ance through health insurance exchanges, as Massa-
chusetts has done.
2. THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILI'TY ACT
The application of another federal law, the insurance
portability provisions of the Health Insurance Porta-
bilitv and Accountability Act (HIPAA), raises other
legal issues that would affect the implementation of
an insurance exchange at the state level. The specific
issue is whether an arrangement where an employer
pays insurance premiums for its employees through
an insurance exchange creates a group health plan
under HIPAA.
HIPAA prohibits group health plans and health
insurance issuers from discriminating on the basis of
health status in determining eligibility or premiums
for members of group health plans. HIPAA imposed
these requirements through amendments to ERISA,
the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Rev-
enue Code (the Tax Code), all of which are quite simi-
lar.6 2 These provisions effectively require guaranteed
issue and community rating to individuals within
group health plans without regard to health status. If
HIPAA applies to purchases of insurance for employ-
ees through an insurance exchange, insurers would not
be able to underwrite individual employees who pur-
chase insurance through the exchange separately, but
would need to offer insurance to all otherwise eligible
employees of any single employer and offer them the
same rate. Other provisions of HIPAA require guar-
anteed issue and renewal for group plans and limit
the use of preexisting conditions clauses within group
plans.",` These provisions would also apply if employees
of a single employer who purchase insurance through
an exchange were treated as a single group. The appli-
cation of HIPAA to state health insurance exchanges
would not preclude the creation of exchanges, but it
would have clear implications for their design. Instead
of simply facilitating the purchase of individual insur-
ance policies through a coordinated market, exchanges
would rather be coordinating the sale of policies to
employment-related groups (in addition to individu-
als who were not employed).
The ERISA provision of HIPAA, 29 USC § 1182,
adopts the ERISA definition of "group health plan"
discussed above, under which the key question is
whether the plan is "established or maintained" by
the employer." If an employer pays part of the cost
of the premium or in some other way endorses a plan
purchased through an exchange, then HIPAA would
apply and the above requirements would apply to the
plan purchased through the exchange. This is true
even though the employer pays for separate individ-
ual policies for each employee, a so-called "list bill-
ing" arrangement."ý5 If an employer, however, neither
contributes to the cost of insurance for employees nor
"endorses" a plan, it would then seem that policies
purchased on a payroll deduction basis (for example,
through a section 125 arrangement) would not be sub-
ject to the HIPAA non-discrimination, small group
coverage, or pre-existing conditions rules under the
ERISA statute, but would simply be individual insur-
ance policies.'35
The HIPAA requirements, however, are also found
in the Tax Code, which incorporates the Tax Code defi-
nition of "group health plan." The Tax Code defines the
term "group health plan" somewhat differently than
does ERISA. It defines a group health plan as a "plan
(including a self-insured plan) of, or contributed to by,
an employer (including a self-employed person) or
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employee organization to provide health care (directly
or otherwise) to the employees" (emphasis added).6 7
This definition raises issues if a state attempts to
require employers to fund health insurance pur-
chases by requiring employers to establish section 125
arrangements.
Section 125 regulations recently proposed by the
I)epartment of the Treasury explicitly permit payment
of individual health insurance premiums from a sec-
tion 125 arrangement, either directly to the insurer or
on an indemnity basis to the employee, suggesting that
the individual policies do not become group policies
simply because the employer collects and remits pre-
mium payments."€• Section 125, however, only exempts
from taxation expenditures for "qualified benefits," i.e.,
benefits otherwise exempt from taxation under other
sections of the Tax Code. 69 The relevant provision of
the Tax Code exempting health benefits is section 106,
which excludes "employer-provided coverage."
Arguabily, therefore, insurance provided through a
section 125 arrangement is a group health plan under
HTIPAA because it is "employer-provided." It can also
be argued that a section 125 arrangement is a group
health plan because it is funded by an employer con-
tribution, because the statute provides that funds in a
section 125 arrangement are not part of an employee's
gross income, and thus might be considered funds
contributed by an employer. The IRS has informally
taken the position that the use of section 125 arrange-
ments to purchase individual policies makes them
group policies tbr purposes of the Tax Code, and thus
for the IlP11AA provisions of the Tax Code.70 In this
view, insurance policies purchased by employees of a
single employer through an insurance exchange with
the finds provided under a section 125 arrangement
would have to comply with the HIPAA non-discrim-
ination, guaranteed access and renewability, and pre-
existing conditions requirements of HIPAA.
The entire issue of the application of HIPAA is
avoided, of course, if a state itself requires commu-
nity rating, guaranteed issue and renewal, and limits
pre-existing conditions clauses from insurers offer-
ing insurance through an insurance exchange. Fed-
eral requirements under HIPAA would, in that case,
be superfluous. Congress could also amend HIPAA
to clarifv either that HIPAA does or does not apply to
insurance policies purchased through exchanges with
section 125 fhnds. The Internal Revenue Service could
also possibly clarify this issue through a regulation
or some other form of guidance. Alternatively, Con-
gress could simply extend the requirements of HIPAA
to all health insurance policies. If Congress does not
change the law, however, and a state allows insurers to
underwrite and rate individuals covered through the
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exchange individually, it would seem that the insurers
would not be able to do so within ERISA group health
plans and within groups of individuals whose premi-
ums are paid by a single employer through a section
125 arrangement.
D. State Regulation of Underwriting, Premiums,
and Benefits
States that regulate non-group insurance or insured
ERISA plans are permitted to regulate insurance
underwriting, premium rates, and benefits. Most states
do so to a greater or lesser extent. 7' States, for example,
require insurers to guarantee coverage and renewal
to small groups (implementing HIPAA), while some
states go further, requiring insurers to offer commu-
nity rates to small groups or individuals or limit the
dispersion of rates through rating bands. States also
require insurance plans to cover specific benefits, pro-
viders, and eligible individuals. The extent to which
states regulate underwriting, premium rates, and ben-
efit coverage is a matter of public policy rather than
law. The policy arguments for and against underwrit-
ing, rating, and benefit coverage mandates are well
known (and passionately asserted), and will not be
repeated here.72 Since these forms of regulation must
be implemented by state law, however, they will be
addressed briefly here.
States that create public or authorize quasi-public
purchasing exchanges can apply underwriting, rat-
ing regulation, and coverage mandates either gener-
ally to the entire insurance market or only within the
purchasing exchange. A state is free to make its own
policy choices in determining which approach to take,
as long as it does not attempt to apply such laws to
self-insured ERISA plans or permit the violation of
HIPAA requirements with respect to group plans.
If a state attempts to apply underwriting and rat-
ing requirements within an insurance exchange that
are not applied generally in the relevant market,
or attempts to impose benefit mandates within an
exchange that are not imposed generally, it exposes
the exchange to adverse selection, which might make
the arrangement untenable.73 If insurers are allowed
to underwrite in the market generally, but not within
the insurance exchange, the exchange may in effect
become a high-risk pool. If insurers are required to
community rate within the insurance exchange but not
otherwise, they may not participate in the exchange. If
states require insurers to offer more generous benefits
within the exchange than they can outside of it, the
rates for exchange products may become compara-
tively unattractive.
Community rating is not the only available strategy
to make insurance purchased through an insurance
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exchange affordable to persons with poor risk pro-
files. An insurance exchange could also, for example,
collect premiums (and tax credits or other forms of
public insurance vouchers) and then pay out premi-
ums on a risk-adjusted basis, as Medicare does with
Medicare Advantage and the Part D drug benefit
plan premiums. Alternatively, insurers selling their
products through the risk pool could be required to
participate in a risk reinsurance pool, so that plans
would not be disadvantaged by taking higher risk
insureds. Third, a public reinsurance program could
be provided to backstop insurers who cover the high-
est risks.71 Fourth, the simple imposition of an indi-
vidual mandate could create a large enough risk pool
that insurers would be comfortable taking on greater
risk exposure. Finally, simply providing substantial
state subsidies for individuals who purchase insurance
through an exchange (but not otherwise) would go far
toward reducing adverse selection against exchange
insurers. Each of these solutions, however, may create
additional responsibilities for exchanges.
III. Private Exchanges
If exchanges are created neither by the federal nor
state government, but rather privately by business
coalitions or groups of employers, they face a differ-
ent set of legal issues.T These entities must comply
with state laws regulating insurance. The NAIC has
a "Private Health Care Voluntary Purchasing Alliance
Model Act,"7'5 and a number of states have adopted
laws or regulations authorizing the creation of insur-
ance exchanges.77 State insurance laws regulating asso-
ciation health plans should also be reviewed to deter-
mine if they affect particular arrangements, although
exchanges should be distinguishable from Association
Health Plans (AHPs) because exchanges offer a choice
of a number of insurers while AHPs usually provide
insurance themselves either through self-insurance or
by contract. 78 Some states prohibit list billing, which
could close off one approach to funding employee
health care through purchasing exchanges.79
Exchanges would, moreover, have to comply with
their contractual obligations and could face claims
under business torts. Both regulatory and common
law vary from state to state, and a 50-state survey of all
state insurance regulations that might affect an insur-
ance exchange would be less productive than focused
analysis of an actual proposal in its own state environ-
ment. There are three federal laws that would affect
privately operated purchasing exchanges, however:
the antitrust laws, ERISA provisions regulating mul-
tiple employer welfare associations (MEWAs), and the
HIPAA privacy regulations. These will be briefly con-
sidered here.
A. Antitrust Law
Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohib-
its "every contract, combination ...or conspiracy in
restraint of trade," while section two prohibits monop-
olization."" Although the federal antitrust laws are
most commonly enforced against sellers of products
and services, they also prohibit unreasonable restraints
of trade imposed by buyers. Monopsony, or the domi-
nation of a market by a buyer, can distort markets just
like monopoly, and can potentially reduce the quantity
and quality of available products.
The explicit purpose of an insurance exchange is to
restrain trade since it organizes the purchase of insur-
ance by individuals and groups. Insurance exchanges
can potentially achieve near monopsonistic market
power in the private insurance market.
At the same time, antitrust law has long permitted
purchasers to engage in joint ventures, including pur-
chasing cooperatives that enhance efficiency and do
not create undue purchaser market power. It is a fair
question, therefore, whether the federal antitrust laws
would limit insurance exchanges.
To begin, federal antitrust laws do not restrict the
authority of the states to establish government-run
insurance exchanges. The Massachusetts Connector,
for example, is not subject to an antitrust challenge.
Antitrust law has developed the State Action Doctrine
to accommodate the interests of federalism and also
permit states to engage in regulatory supervision of
commerce in their states. The State Action Doctrine
exempts state entities from federal antitrust law if
their conduct is compelled or clearly authorized by
state law. If the state law pertains to conduct by pri-
vate actors, then that conduct must be compelled or
authorized and must be actively supervised by the
state.,' Situations arise, however, in which the state
explicitly or impliedly authorizes or encourages actors
to engage in conduct that violates federal antitrust
law, but the level of state supervision may fall short of
that required under Supreme Court precedent. Thus,
the State Action Doctrine would not apply, leaving the
conduct exposed to antitrust enforcement.
If an insurance exchange is created solely by private
action, for example, by a coalition of private employ-
ers, there is by definition a combination of actors,
leaving only the question of whether this combina-
tion is a restraint of trade. This is a complex question,
the answer to which depends heavily on the factual
situation of a particular exchange. The issues raised
by antitrust law for insurance exchanges were ana-
lyzed thoroughly by Clark Havighurst a decade ago,12
and a decade earlier by H. Robert Harper and John
J. Miles,"" and their analysis will not be repeated in
detail here.
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A few salient points can, however, be made. First, as
already noted, private purchasing coalitions are prob-
lematic under the federal antitrust laws. Courts apply-
ing the antitrust laws may be somewhat less troubled
by buyer than by seller cartels, but restraints of trade
imposed by buyers can still be antitrust violations.
Second, naked price restraints imposed by a combina-
tion of buyers and lacking any efficiency justifications
can be per se violations of the antitrust laws - that is,
illegal regardless of any other justification that may be
offered. In most instances, however, courts will evalu-
ate purchasing coalitions under the rule of reason
- that is, review their legality in the context of their
particular market and consider their "pro" and "anti"
competitive effects. Applying the rule of reason, courts
will be concerned with pro-competitive justifications
for joint purchasing arrangements. Given the market
failures present in health care, it may be quite possi-
ble to justify joint purchasing as efficiency enhancing
in many situations.84 In particular, purchasing pools
are pro-competitive insofar as they offer individuals
and small employers the chance to achieve risk pool-
ing and economies of scale not otherwise available.
Third, if an exchange does nothing more than orga-
nize a market for insurance without negotiating prices
- for example, by providing information, structuring
choices, and discouraging adverse selection - it is
unlikely to be found in violation of the antitrust laws.
Indeed, such activities may increase rather than sup-
press competition.85
A coalition without excessive market power is prob-
ably safe in any event. Defining the relevant prod-
uct and geographic markets affected by insurance
exchanges itself is a complicated endeavor. Antitrust
cases have in various contexts identified insurance
markets on the "sell side," the markets in which insur-
ers sell their products, as including individual and
small groups, and excluding larger employers and self-
insured plans. The "buy side" market, in which insurers
compete with other purchasers in purchasing services,
such as physician services, may include other purchas-
ers such as Medicare and Medicaid, and not be limited
to private insurers only. A market must be defined for
the market share to be determined. If the market is
defined narrowly enough, insurance exchanges affect-
ing private plans may be found to have large market
shares, but if the market is defined broadly, their share
may not be troublesomely large.
The Department of Justice, Federal Trade Com-
mission Statement on Antitrust Enforcement Policy
in Health Care on Joint Purchasing Arrangements
creates a safe harbor for health care providers whose
"purchases account for less than 35 percent of the total
sales of the purchased product or services in the rele-
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vant market,""• a market-percentage that would prob-
ably apply to insurance purchasing as well. However,
a coalition that offers its members access to a wide
variety of insurance plans and products is unlikely to
be found to be in restraint of trade even if its share is
larger.
Currently existing private insurance exchanges have
tended to control only a small share of the market,
and thus not to pose antitrust problems. If this were
to change, Congress could amend the antitrust laws to
exempt health insurance exchanges that allow the par-
ticipation of multiple insurers from antitrust scrutiny.
Alternatively, the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission could promulgate a new enforce-
ment guideline delineating more clearly the circum-
stances under which they would consider a private
health insurance exchange to be in compliance with
the antitrust laws.
B. Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangement
Regulation
A private insurance exchange that offers health insur-
ance to employees is a multiple employer welfare
arrangement (MEWA) under ERISA, and thus subject
to regulation under state and federal law. The extent to
which a private exchange is subject to state or federal
regulation depends, however, on the type of MEWA it
would regulate. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40) defines a MEWA
as:
an employee welfare benefit plan, or any other
arrangement (other than an employee welfare
benefit plan), which is established or maintained
for the purpose of offering or providing any ben-
efit described earlier in the statute, including
health insurance, to the employees of two or more
employers (including one or more self-employed
individuals), or to their beneficiaries.87
An "employee welfare benefit plan," as noted in the
above discussion of ERISA, is "any plan, fund, or
program which...is ...established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both,...for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insur-
ance or otherwise, []medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits.",', Finally, an employer is "any person act-
ing directly as an employer, or indirectly in the inter-
est of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit
plan; and includes a group or association of employers
acting for an employer in such capacity" (emphasis
added). 89
Under these definitions, if a group of employers
gets together to form an insurance exchange, it would
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almost certainly be a MEWA, but could be either
one of the following: (1) a MEWA which is also an
employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA estab-
lished or maintained by an "employer,"(which can be
a group or association of employers) or (2) a MEWA
which is "any other arrangement.. .established or main-
tained fbr the purpose of offering or providing" health
insurance to employees of two or more employers or
to self-employed individuals."9) Under the Depart-
ment of Labor's interpretation of ERISA, a "group or
association" of employers can only be an "employer"
if it is determined to be a bona fide group of employ-
ers, taking into consideration a number of factors,
including how members are solicited, who can partici-
pate and who in fact participates, the purpose of the
organization, any pre-existing relationships among
the members, and most importantly, whether the
employee-members of the group exercise control over
the program.91 An exchange formed by an association
of employers who do not qualify as a bona fide group
or by a private entity other than a bona fide employer
group could be an "other arrangement" MEWA, but
would not be an employee welfare benefit plan.,92
MEWAs that are also ERISA plans are fully regu-
lated by ERISA, including its disclosure, fiduciary
obligation, HIPAA, and benefit mandate provisions.
Thus an insurance exchange that was considered to be
an ERISA plan-MEWA could be sued in federal court
by its members for breach of fiduciary obligation or for
a denial of claims and could not discriminate in pre-
miums or eligibility based on health status. A MEWA
that is not an employee welfare benefit plan is not itself
regulated by ERISA, but every participating employer
is considered to each have independently established a
single-employer plan subject to ERISAYs The admin-
istrators of a non-ERISA plan MEWA are nonetheless
still likely to be held to be fiduciaries insofar as they
have discretionary duties in administering the terms
of the constituent employers' ERISA plansY9 Federal
law also requires MEWAs to file with the Department
of Labor.9-
Under the 1983 Erlenborn Amendinent, states are
emlpowered to regulate ERISA plans that are also
MEWAs. This amendment to ERISA allows states to
regulate both insured and self-insured MEWAs that
are ERISA plans, effectively exempting them from
the preemptive power of ERISA provisions that pro-
hibit the states from regulating self-insured plans.9'
By definition, insurance exchanges would be insured
rather than self-insured MEWAs, since exchanges
exist to organize a market in which several insurers
offer plans to exchange participants rather than offer
insurance themselves. Under this section of ERISA,
states are limited in their authority to regulate insured
MEWAs.97 States may only impose "standards, requir-
ing the maintenance of specified levels of reserves and
specified levels of contributions, which any such plan,
or any trust established under such a plan, must meet
in order to be considered under such law able to pay
benefits in full when due" on an insured MEWA.9`
This would rarely be relevant to insurance exchanges,
since they do not normally bear risk. States may also
presumably regulate any insurer that sells insurance
through an exchange because regulation of insurers
would be saved from preemption under the general
ERISA savings clause, which saves state insurance
regulation from preemption.99 But the state regula-
tion would probably have to apply to all insurers in the
market, which could be the small group or individual
market, not just to insurers participating in a particu-
lar exchange.
Finally, states may regulate private insurance
exchanges that might be classified as MEWAs, but
are not ERISA plans, under the states' inherent police
power, since state regulation of MEWAs that are not
ERISA plans do not "relate to" ERISA plans.100 States
may be limited in their ability to provide judicial rem-
edies for beneficiaries against insurers who provide
insurance through such MEWAs, however, because
beneficiaries are members of their own employer's sin-
gle-employer ERISA plan, and only secondarily mem-
bers of the MEWA. Thus, actions against the insurers
may be considered to be actions against those plans
and would be preempted by ERISA's remedial provi-
sions.1•1 State law claims brought by employers against
a MEWA, on the other hand, are not preempted by
ERISA.102
Private insurance exchanges are likely to be classi-
fied as MEWAs, and therefore, in general be subject
to state regulation. The power of the states to regulate
insurance exchanges operated by "bona fide" employer
associations, and thus considered to be ERISA plans,
is very limited and does not reach the most impor-
tant issues that states may want to regulate. Private
insurance exchanges that are MEWAs, but not ERISA
plans, are subject to state regulation, but are prob-
ably also subject to the ERISA requirements that bind
plan administrators to the extent that the exchange
managers act as administrators of the ERISA plans
of the MEWA's member employers.,03 To date, many
states have not yet exercised their authority to regu-
late MEWAs, and few states have regulated MEWAs
effectively.,04
If Congress adopts comprehensive health insurance
reform, but leaves a role for private health insurance
exchanges, it could take over responsibility for regu-
lating them or clarify the authority of the states to
regulate. If Congress takes no action, states would still
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be free to exercise their authority to regulate MEWAs
that are not operated by "bona fide" employer associa-
tions. They may also want to test carefully the status
of M EWAs that claim to be ERISA plans since they are
largely e.empt from state regulation.
(C. HIMltA Data Privacy Requirements
Private insurance exchanges would, finally, be subject
tol I I PAA regulations on privacy.1(") The HIPAA Privacy
Rule is discussed at length in another "Legal Solutions
in Hlealth Reform" authored by Deven McGraw, so it
will onlv be addressed briefly here. The privacy rule
applies to any individually identifiable health informa-
tion in the hands of covered entities. Covered entities
include only health care providers, health plans, and
health care clearinghouses.''` "Health plans" include
most public and private insurers, including those that
would participate in insurance exchanges, but would
seemn not to include an exchange itself.07
tlealth plans may disclose information without
consent for the fIllowing reasons: (1) treatment; (2)
health care operations, which includes "underwriting,
prenium rating, and other activities relating to the
operation; (3) renewal or replacement of a contract of
health insurance or health benefits"; and (4) payment,
which includes "activities undertaken by a health plan
to obtain premiums.",(),, Health plans may also dis-
close "de-identified data,"'(19 which is not covered by
I I 1PAA, and may disclose personal health data, which
is covered, to "business associates" with appropriate
contractual assurances to safeguard data."( It would
seem that health plais could disclose health infor-
imation regarding their members to health insurance
exchanges under one or more of these provisions, sub-
ject however, to a further caveat. Health plans, and
thereibre insurance exchanges as their agents, may
only disclose to "plan sponsors" (i.e., employers) de-
identified "summary health information" and infor-
ination as to whether an individual is participating
in the sponsor's group health plan.'" This would limit
information flow fr'om exchanges to employers who
piu rchase insurance through them.
Although HIIPAA constraints on the infornma-
tion that health plans can share with exchanges and
exchanges with employers are important, data flow in
the other direction from employers or employees to
exchanges and then to health plans foir underwriting or
setting premiums is likely to be even more important.
hintformation acquired by a health insurance exchange
in this vvay would in all likelihood only be protected
by I IIIPAA if'the exchange were a business associate of
a health plan that "allow[ed] a business associate to
create or receive protected health infbrmation on its
beialf"'' It would be important, therefore, fbr health
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insurance exchanges to enter into contracts with
health plans that identify the exchange as a "business
associate" of the health plans with assurances that the
exchange would protect any personal health informa-
tion it received to be sent on to covered plans. If this is
not done, individuals and employers may be reluctant
to disclose information to exchanges.
Congress should amend HIPAA to clarifi' that health
insurance exchanges are bound by the HIPAA privacy
rule, perhaps by including them within the definition
of "health plan" found in HIPAA's language." Even if
Congress fails to amend HIPAA specifically fbr insur-
ance exchange, private health insurance exchanges
could enter into business associate contracts with
health care plans whose products they sell and could
comply with HIPAA requirements, including limita-
tions on the sharing of identifiable health data with
employers.
IV. Summary of Potential Solutions
A. Implemenitation ofla Feder'al PurePihasiing Ex,change
Congress could constitutionally establish an exchange
program operated solely by the federal government,
which could be operated either at the national or the
regional level. Congress, however, cannot simply com-
mand the states to implement a federally established
and defined health exchange program. It could, how-
ever, use its power to spend money to offer the states
financial incentives to encourage them to participate
in an insurance exchange program. Alternatively, Con-
gress could invite the states to establish exchanges,
but also administer a federally operated fall-back pro-
gram for states that decline participation, as it does
now with respect to HIPAA provisions. Whatever
approach it takes, Congress should make certain that
any statute it adopts explicitly notes that the program
is being established as one that regulates the business
of insurance to forestall challenges under the McCa-
rran-Ferguson Act. If Congress establishes a national
purchasing exchange program, it must be aware of
other applicable federal administrative laxw require-
ments, and either amend relevant laws accordingly or
ensure that federal exchanges comply wvith them.
The Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings
Clauses of the Constitution limit the power of Con-
gress to regulate insurers, although the Constitution
prohibits only extreme discriminatory or confiscatory
actions, and would not preclude most forms of regu-
lation. Government exchanges that allow all insurers
that accept exchange rules to participate in exchanges
are unlikely to face successful constitutional litigation.
If government exchanges exclude insurers from par-
ticipating, they should do so according to clearly estab-
lished guidelines and for clearly articulated purposes.
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B. State Erchanges
If Congress fails to take action to establish a national
health insurance exchange, the states could take the
initiative to establish exchanges on their own. States
initiating purchasing exchanges would be bound by
the same constitutional constraints facing the fed-
eral government, in addition to the peculiarities of
state constitutions, which, in some instances, impose
greater restraints on economic regulation.
State exchanges will also need to comply with state
administrative law and other laws governing state
agencies, such as state civil service or purchasing
requirements. States establishing insurance exchanges
will need to clarify relationships between the exchange
and other state agencies with jurisdiction over insur-
ance issues. Specifically, an exchange could be part
of the state's Department of Insurance or could be a
separate entity.
As it is currently written, ERISA precludes states
from requiring employee benefit plans to purchase
insurance through exchanges. States may require indi-
viduals to do so, however, and may regulate insurers
that sell their products through exchanges. States mnay
also require employers who do not offer health insur-
ance to allow their employees to purchase insurance
through exchanges with pre-tax dollars using see-
tion 125 arrangements. To avoid ERISA challenges,
employers will have to be careful to ensure that they
are not perceived as "endorsing" such arrangements
and should not offer discounts only to employees who
purchase insurance through the exchange.
If states allow employee groups to participate in
an insurance exchange as groups (i.e., if the employer
contributes to or administers the arrangement), then
HIPAA will require that participating insurers pro-
vide insurance on a guaranteed offer and renewability
basis. HIPAA also prohibits discrimination in eligi-
bility or premiums based on health status, and lim-
its pre-existing conditions clauses for participating
employee groups. HIPAA would probably impose the
same requirements for all employees of a particular
employer if the employees were to purchase insur-
ance through section 125 arrangements, even without
employer contributions. If a state requires commu-
nitv rating, guaranteed issue and renewal, and limits
preexisting conditions clauses within the exchange,
and thus, effectively applies HIPAA protections to all
exchange participants, then the state may avoid the
issue of whether employees who participate in the
plan under a section 125 arrangement are indepen-
dently protected by HIPAA.
Congress could amend ERISA and HIPAA to clarify
their requirements for insurance exchanges. It is pos-
sible that the Internal Revenue Service could, even in
the absence of congressional action, clarify whether or
not the use of a section 125 arrangement automatically
creates a group plan for HIPAA purposes.
States could consider applying uniform regulation
of underwriting, premiums, and benefits both inside
and outside of insurance exchanges to avoid exposing
exchanges to adverse selection or limiting the ability
of exchanges to compete with insurers selling outside
the exchange. Alternatively, states could only allow the
purchase of insurance through the exchange in spe-
cific markets such as individual and/or small group.
C. Private Insurance E.rchanges
If neither Congress nor the states proceed with estab-
lishing insurance exchanges, exchanges could still be
created by private entities or associations. Congress
could create a special antitrust exemption for pri-
vate insurance exchanges. The Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission could also clari67 the
status of exchanges through issuing an enforcement
guideline. States may shield private exchanges from
antitrust liability if the state explicitly authorizes and
actively supervises the exchanges. If the state does not
do so, private exchanges should be prepared to limit
themselves to 350 of the market and/or be able to
offer procompetitive justifications for the restraints
they impose on the market.
Private exchanges should be aware that their mem-
bership and organizational rules will determine
whether they are regulated primarily by the state or
federal government. Under the federal law governing
MEWAs, "bona fide" employer association exchanges
will be primarily regulated by ERISA, while other
exchanges by the states. Congress could, of course,
expand the power of the states to comprehensively
regulate all MEWAs or could extend federal authority
over them.
Since HIPAA could implicate private exchanges and
the exchange of protected health information, Con-
gress could amend HIPAA's privacy rules to specifically
clarify that they cover health insurance exchanges.
If Congress fails to amend HIPAA, exchanges could
enter into business associate agreements with insurers
to the extent that they will need to access health data
on insureds. To avoid legal challenges and to protect
privacy, exchanges should not disclose personal health
data to employers except to the extent permitted by
HIPAA.
Conclusion
Health insurance purchasing exchanges have been
proposed as a possible means of making insurance
more accessible, increasing competition among
health plans, and promoting choice of insurer. Presi-
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dent Maina and congressional leaders have proposed
establishing insurance exchanges through federal
legislation. There are no serious constitutional bars
to Congress's establishing an insurance exchange,
although the Constitution might limit the means that
Congress could use if it chose to implement an insur-
atnce exchange program through the states. Alterna-
tively, Congress could amend a number of laws such as
F,RISA, tiIPAA, and the antitrust laws to ease the ere-
ation of state or private ptirchasing exchanges. Even
in the absence of any congressional action, however,
the creation of purchasing exchanges by the states or
by private entities and associations are not likely to be
precluded by legal considerations. State and private
purchasing exchanges do raise a number of important
legal issues, however, that would need to be consid-
ered by iiny state or private entity creating an insur-
ance exc]litnge p)rograml.
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